Summary
An attacker who can place a malicious URL in an Attribute View mAsse field can trigger stored XSS when a victim opens the Gallery or Kanban view with “Cover From -> Asset Field” enabled. The vulnerable code accepts arbitrary http(s) URLs without extensions as images, stores the attacker-controlled string in coverURL, and injects it directly into an <img src="..."> attribute without escaping. In the Electron desktop client, the injected JavaScript executes with nodeIntegration enabled and contextIsolation disabled, so the XSS reaches arbitrary OS command execution under the victim’s account.
Details
The vulnerable flow is:
IsPossiblyImage(assetPath) accepts arbitrary http(s) URLs without validating that they are safe image URLs.- When an Attribute View card uses
Cover From -> Asset Field, the application copies asset.Content directly into galleryCard.CoverURL / kanbanCard.CoverURL.
- The front-end renderer inserts
coverURL directly into <img src="${getCompressURL(item.coverURL)}"> without escaping quotes or other attribute-breaking characters.
- A payload such as
https://example.com/" onerror="require('child_process').exec('calc') breaks out of the src attribute and adds an attacker-controlled onerror handler.
When the image fails to load, the injected JavaScript runs in the Electron renderer. Because the desktop app enables nodeIntegration: true and disables contextIsolation and webSecurity, that JavaScript can access Node.js APIs and execute system commands.
PoC
- Install Electron Desktop app.
- Create a database / Attribute View with an mAsset column and add at least one row.
- Add any legitimate image to that mAsset field so the entry is stored as type image.
- Switch the view to Gallery or Kanban.
5.Set Cover From to Asset Field and choose the mAsset column.
- Edit the existing image asset entry and replace its link with the following payload:
https://example.com/" onerror="require('child_process').exec('calc')
- Save the change and reopen or refresh the Gallery / Kanban view.
- Observe that the rendered HTML contains an injected onerror handler and the Calculator application starts on Windows.
Example rendered output:
<img loading="lazy" class="av__gallery-img" src="https://example.com/" onerror="require('child_process').exec('calc')">Impact
An attacker can store malicious content in a database asset field and execute arbitrary JavaScript when another user opens the affected Gallery or Kanban view. In the desktop client, that JavaScript has access to Node.js APIs, so the impact is not limited to browser-context XSS. The payload executes OS commands with the victim’s local user privileges, which turns this into remote code execution on the desktop application once the malicious content is delivered and rendered.
References
ngocnn97 Reporter
Summary
An attacker who can place a malicious URL in an Attribute View
mAssefield can trigger stored XSS when a victim opens the Gallery or Kanban view with “Cover From -> Asset Field” enabled. The vulnerable code accepts arbitraryhttp(s)URLs without extensions as images, stores the attacker-controlled string incoverURL, and injects it directly into an<img src="...">attribute without escaping. In the Electron desktop client, the injected JavaScript executes withnodeIntegrationenabled andcontextIsolationdisabled, so the XSS reaches arbitrary OS command execution under the victim’s account.Details
The vulnerable flow is:
IsPossiblyImage(assetPath)accepts arbitraryhttp(s)URLs without validating that they are safe image URLs.Cover From -> Asset Field, the application copiesasset.Contentdirectly intogalleryCard.CoverURL / kanbanCard.CoverURL.coverURLdirectly into<img src="${getCompressURL(item.coverURL)}">without escaping quotes or other attribute-breaking characters.https://example.com/" onerror="require('child_process').exec('calc')breaks out of thesrcattribute and adds an attacker-controlledonerrorhandler.When the image fails to load, the injected JavaScript runs in the Electron renderer. Because the desktop app enables
nodeIntegration: trueand disablescontextIsolationandwebSecurity, that JavaScript can access Node.js APIs and execute system commands.PoC
5.Set Cover From to Asset Field and choose the mAsset column.
Example rendered output:
Impact
An attacker can store malicious content in a database asset field and execute arbitrary JavaScript when another user opens the affected Gallery or Kanban view. In the desktop client, that JavaScript has access to Node.js APIs, so the impact is not limited to browser-context XSS. The payload executes OS commands with the victim’s local user privileges, which turns this into remote code execution on the desktop application once the malicious content is delivered and rendered.
References